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The Self Is Not Gendered:
Sulabha’s Debate with King Janaka
RUTH VANITA
This essay highlights the debate on women and gender in ancient Indian
texts. Neither the popular nor the scholarly debate in modern India has
paid sufficient attention to unmarried learned women in ancient Hindu
texts. I examine the recurrent fi gure of Sulabha, a single woman and
an intellectual-renunciant; I focus on her debate with philosopher-king
Janaka in the epic Mahabharata. When Janaka uses anti-women arguments to critique Sulabha’s unconventional behavior, Sulabha successfully establishes, on the basis of Hindu philosophical principles, that
there is no essential difference between a man and a woman; she also
demonstrates by her own example that a woman may achieve liberation by the same means as a man. In the same epic, a married woman
wins her debate with a male sage, proving that even a woman following
the conventional path of wifely devotion may equal or outdo a sage in
wisdom and virtue.
Keywords: antiquity / gender / Hinduism / India / Mahabharata / Manusmriti / women
Who is Sulabha? Not many people, not even many Sanskrit scholars,
recognize the name at once. She is a single woman, a learned renunciant, who, in the ancient epic, the Mahabharata, wins a debate with
philosopher-king Janaka in the presence of eminent Brahman scholars.
In this debate, Sulabha logically establishes that there is no essential difference between a man and a woman; she also demonstrates by her own
example that a woman may achieve liberation by the same means as a
man. Modern scholars of the Mahabharata have not paid much attention
to this episode nor have feminist studies of ancient India given it the
importance it deserves.1

Modern Debates and Ancient Debates on Women
In modern India, there is both a scholarly and a popular debate on women
in ancient India. The popular wing of this debate suffers from an over
emphasis on the law book, Manavadharmashastra or Manusmriti (circa
first century CE).2 This emphasis is largely the legacy of British colonial
administrators who, although they themselves were familiar with British
common law, similar in some ways to the plethora of regional and com©2003 NWSA J OU R NA L , VOL . 15 N O . 2 (S UM M ER )
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munity customary laws prevailing amongst Hindus, decided to simplify
their administrative tasks in India by compiling a digest of Hindu law
based on translations of ancient treatises. To this end, the Bengal government published Sir William Jones’s translation of Manusmriti in 1794.
The British justified their rule partly by attacking Indian social and
political structures as iniquitous. This attack was primarily focused
on Brahmans, hence the Manusmriti, which the Jones school of British administrators had magnified as symbolic of India’s greatness, was
declared a Brahmanical code and critiqued by the Macaulay school of
administrators as symbolic of Indian society’s backwardness.
Indian nationalists also took sides in this popular debate that still
continues today. By selective quotation of some of Manu’s dicta, such as
his famous statement that the gods reside where women are honored, one
group argues that the Manusmriti exalts women. By equally selective
quotation of others of his dicta, such as his famous pronouncement that
a woman should never be independent but should be under the protection
of her father in youth, husband in adulthood, and son in old age, the other
group argues that the Manusmriti is the source of gender oppression in
India. Both groups agree in projecting Manu as the source of Hindu law.
Thus, when admirers of Manu installed a statue of him in the precincts of
the high court in Rajasthan, western India, his detractors protested, and
burnt copies of the Manusmriti on 25 March 2000 (Kishwar 2000, 3).
Scholars agree that women’s status declined from the Vedic period (c.
1500 BCE) to the period beginning about the fi rst century CE. They differ,
however, as to the extent of the decline. Some scholars, while agreeing
that women in the epics and Puranas (the Puranas are sacred texts dedicated to various deities, composed between the second century BCE and
the thirteenth century CE) are generally subordinated to men, nevertheless
claim that women are usually honored, have equal status to men in some
spheres, and even more power than men in a few spheres.3
On the other hand, many Marxist and feminist critics argue that in this
period woman “totally lost her human dignity” and “has been a chattel
in India ever since the later Vedic times” (Bhattacharji 1994, 12, 89), and
internalized her subordination to the extent that she did not protest or
question it (Shah 1995, 72). These scholars view the dramatic rise of goddess worship and goddess theology from the Puranic period onwards as
irrelevant to or even detrimental to women’s status insofar as goddesses
“do not suffer” and human women therefore cannot “feel empathy” with
them (Bhattacharji 1994, 36). Some feminist scholars disagree with this
view, and argue that to the extent that goddesses are seen as residing
in women and girls, especially in Tantra and Shakta traditions, they do
empower human women (Kinsley 1986; Gupta 2000).
In my view, modern debates do not sufficiently recognize the fact
that there was an ongoing debate about women in ancient Hindu texts.
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The often seemingly self-contradictory pronouncements about women
found in accretive ancient texts may reflect that debate, as do the varying
interpretations of oral as well as written law. Both in pre-modern and in
modern India, laws, especially written laws, are accessible to very few
people and followed by even fewer, while most people are more likely to
follow practices that are customary within their local castes and communities. However, these customary laws that vary widely from region
to region and even village to village, are themselves always in dispute and
open to varying interpretations, just as are written law codes. Hindu written law codes, from the Manusmriti through the British law codes to laws
passed in independent India, always recognize the legal force and validity
of custom. It is the bewildering plethora of interpretations of customary
law that constitute the ongoing debate in the legal arena.
The varying versions and interpretations of the epic and Puranic stories
that emerged at different times and places across the country and were
accessible to most people through regular oral retellings and dramatic
enactments also represent that debate. The Sulabha-Janaka debate in the
canonical Sanskrit Mahabharata is an important example of that ongoing
discussion. Janaka argues in favor of women’s subordination, projecting
a view found both in the Manusmriti and in many other texts, including
the epics.4 Sulabha contests this view, basing her arguments on standard
philosophical propositions.
Finally, I compare and contrast the Sulabha-Janaka debate with another
similar debate in the Mahabharata—that between a married woman and
the great sage Kaushika. Once again, the woman wins the debate and
proves that while following the conventional path of wifely devotion, she
is in fact more virtuous than he is. While many women could hope to
imitate this model, fewer could aspire to be like Sulabha.

The Single Woman as Intellectual
I am interested in the figure of the single woman as intellectual-renunciant. This figure defies the dictum that a woman should always be under
the protection of a man. How do the texts in which a figure like Sulabha
appears justify her existence independent of men? How do they value her
contribution to knowledge?
Behind the figure of the autonomous learned woman stands the figure
of the autonomous goddess who presides over learning. Paradoxically,
while the goddess of speech and of learning and the arts, Saraswati, generally represented without a consort, is very prominent in Indian popular culture, feminist scholars, both in the West and in India, have paid
scarcely any attention to her. They have focused most of their attention
on warrior mother goddesses such as Durga, Kali, and Chhinamasta.5

T HE S ELF I S N OT G ENDERED

79

Concomitantly, feminist study of women’s agency and resistance in the
epics has focused not on single women but on the angry protests of wives,
such as Draupadi’s protest against her husband Yudhishthira’s gambling
her away, or Sita’s protest against her husband Rama’s unjust and harsh
treatment of her after he rescues her from her abductor, Ravana. Less
attention has been paid to women’s participation in intellectual and
philosophical conversation, even though both Sita and Draupadi engage
in such conversations. Conversely, within mainstream Hindu tradition,
Saraswati, who is widely worshiped in educational institutions and by
those engaged in the arts, has been a symbol for education in general, and
women’s education in particular.
It is noteworthy that in the earliest Hindu sacred text, the Rigveda
Samhita (c. 1500 BCE), the goddess Vak has no consort, and Saraswati too
is worshiped without a consort in most traditions. On the other hand, the
warrior goddesses are mostly incarnations of Parvati, consort of Shiva.
Radha, who has received a lot of attention from scholars of Vaishnavism,
is usually worshiped along with Krishna (Hawley and Wulff 1982). Feminist scholars’ neglect of Saraswati is related to their focus on wives and
mothers to the neglect of single women in ancient Indian texts.
Sulabha is a female ascetic or Rishika who is not a Brahman but a
Kshatriya. Like the philosopher-king, Janaka, she belongs to the rulerwarrior community, not the priestly and scholarly community. Whereas
Janaka is a husband and a king even while he pursues philosophical truth,
Sulabha, by becoming an ascetic, opts out of social institutions like marriage, caste, and community.
It is important that neither Sulabha nor Janaka is just a character
in a particular story, as is, for example, the Pandava hero Bhima. Both
Sulabha and Janaka are symbolic figures who appear in different texts, in
the Vedic as well as in the epic and Puranic periods. She represents the
female scholar par excellence and he the scholar who is also a king. Thus
the Saulabha Shakha (now lost) of the Rigveda Samhita is attributed to
Sulabha. She appears again in the Kaushitaki Brahmana, in the list of
revered teachers to whom salutations must be offered. Her most important
appearance as a character is in the Shanti Parva of the epic Mahabharata,
where she enters into a debate with King Janaka.
The Mahabharata, an accretive text whose date is disputed, was probably composed and compiled over a period of 800 years, between the fourth
century BCE and the fourth century CE. Often termed the fi fth Veda, it is
the longest epic in the world, and tells the story of a battle between two
sets of cousins. This story is submerged in a plethora of other stories,
debates, and discussions. Even though few Hindus have read the entire
epic, the stories of the Mahabharata are widely disseminated through
song, drama, and now cinema and television. Figures and events from
these stories have become both idiomatic and figurative in Indian lan-
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guages. The Mahabharata contains the BhagvadGita, the dialog between
Krishna and Arjuna that is among the most widely read Hindu sacred
texts.

Debate and Dialog in Hindu Texts
Debate is the single most important organizing principle in ancient Hindu
texts. It may take the form of structured question and answer, friendly
discussion and dialog, or formal shastrartha (debate) between rival schools
of thought. In the Mahabharata it occurs most often as conversation.
In fact, the whole epic is structured as a series of conversations encased
one within the other. These conversations take place between ancestors
and descendants, male friends (Krishna and Arjuna), male and female
friends (Krishna and Draupadi), female friends (Draupadi and Satyabhama),
enemies, siblings, parents and children, husbands and wives, gods and
humans, human and non-human animals, servants and masters, teachers
and pupils, and strangers who encounter one another by chance.
A wide spectrum of issues, ranging from vegetarianism to justice to
gender to the means of attaining liberation from rebirth, are discussed
at length, and powerful arguments are advanced on several sides of each
question. While many different answers are presented, one of them usually, but not always, emerges as the correct answer. This does not mean,
however, that the other answers are completely invalidated.
Perhaps the most famous debate between a woman and a man in an
ancient Hindu text is that between Gargi and Yajnavalkya, which takes
place in the presence of King Janaka, in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad.
Feminist scholars usually cite this debate as an example of the silencing
of women in patriarchal society because the debate ends with Yajnavalkya
silencing Gargi by telling her that if she asks any more questions her head
will fall off.
Conversely, both the debates here examined—between King Janaka
and the female ascetic Sulabha, and between the married woman and
the sage Kaushika—end with the silencing of the male participant. The
Sulabha-Janaka debate takes place in the Shanti Parva section of the epic
Mahabharata. The Shanti Parva was composed later than many other
sections of the epic, but is philosophically well integrated with the rest
of the epic.
The Sulabha-Janaka debate may reflect a debate between different
schools of Hindu philosophy. While it is framed as a debate regarding
the relative superiority of action and renunciation as paths to liberation
(moksha) from the cycle of rebirth, this is also a debate about gender, specifically whether a woman can be autonomous, can be a man’s intellectual
equal or superior, and can attain emancipation independently.
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Although the text may be influenced by Buddhism and/or may be
responding to Buddhism, Sulabha is not represented as a Buddhist. While
Buddhism introduced organized female asceticism (despite the initial
reluctance of Buddha to allow women into the monastic order), Hindu
female ascetics do appear in many ancient texts. Sulabha is of particular
interest because her asceticism is not undertaken in the capacity of a
hermit’s wife, as is that of other female hermits in the Mahabharata. She
is a single woman who is an ascetic in her own right. Nor is she part of any
organized order or monastery, as Buddhist nuns were. We are explicitly
told that she wanders over the earth. As such, she represents one type or
ideal of Hindu asceticism, here embodied in a female. This is important,
because many modern commentators who see Buddhism as more liberatory for women than Hinduism tend to think that renunciation was available to Buddhist but not to Hindu women.
Hindu texts in general tend to represent women as embodiments
of action, and to reserve renunciation for men. In the Vedic texts, the
primal principle of action or nature, Prakriti, is gendered female, while
Purusha, or the consciousness that witnesses action while remaining
detached from it, is gendered male. This gendering of primal principles
is of course not coterminous with human males and females, since each
human individual partakes of both Purusha and Prakriti. Nevertheless,
that gendering does influence Hindu ideas of gender roles, with the man
being perceived as more inclined to spiritual knowledge and the woman
as more inclined to earthly action. Both scholarly and popular wisdom
subscribe to the idea that the primary path to emancipation for a Hindu
woman is devotion to her husband. Several normative characters in the
Mahabharata actually state this to be the case.
The figure of Sulabha, however, shows that the Mahabharata, like
Hindu thought in general, is by no means unified on this issue. The
equation of women with action is not a necessary one. It is possible and
desirable for a Hindu woman to attain emancipation by renunciation.
The Atman (Self/Spirit) is gendered neuter in Sanskrit, and is the same
in all beings. This premise is basic to Sulabha’s sophisticated argument
regarding the irrelevance of gender to emancipation or to the particular
path taken by an individual.

Context of the Debate
The Shanti Parva is, as its name indicates, about peace in its widest
sense. More specifically, this long section of the Mahabharata occurs
as a conversation between the eldest of the five Pandava brothers, King
Yudhishthira, and his great-uncle Bhishma. The conversation occurs after
the battle has been won by the Pandavas.
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Bhishma is the son of the river goddess Ganga. His name literally
means “the terrible” because of the awe-inspiring vow of lifelong celibacy he took as a young man to please his father, and he is the epitome
of the virtuous and wise person. He participates in the battle in a selfless
manner because his vow of celibacy was accompanied by renunciation of
the kingship in favor of his younger brother. Though childless, he functions in the text as a father figure to all his nephews. Fatally wounded
during the battle, he does not die because he has the power to die only
when he chooses. He lies on a bed of arrows that he considers the only fit
bed for a warrior.
After the battle, the Pandavas, King Yudhishthira, and their allies go
to visit Bhishma. Yudhishthira, who throughout the text represents the
virtuous wisdom-seeker, questions Bhishma about how to rule as a king
and how to achieve liberation from the cycle of rebirth. His questions and
Bhishma’s answers compose the Shanti Parva. The title suggests that the
answers, if acted upon, establish peace after war, in the individual and in
society. After Bhishma has spoken about the various aspects of kingship
and rule, Yudhishthira asks Bhishma how to attain liberation from the
cycle of death and rebirth. This section within the Shanti Parva is known
as Mokshadharma Parva.
At one point in this section, Yudhishthira asks how one can avoid old
age and death. Bhishma tells him that King Janaka had once asked his
guru, the Rishi (ascetic) named Panchashikha, this question and was told
that old age and death cannot be avoided. All human relationships are
transient like life itself. The only way to escape death is to escape birth
as well, that is, to be freed from the cycle of rebirth. Yudhishthira, himself a husband, father, and king, then asks whether it is possible to attain
emancipation from the cycle of rebirth without abandoning the domestic
way of life.
In response, Bhishma recounts the story of Janaka and Sulabha. King
Janaka, in ancient Hindu texts, is the epitome of the philosopher king, a
perfectly wise ruler who is also a sage. Bhishma says that a female mendicant and yogini, Sulabha, while wandering over the earth, hears from
many ascetics that Janaka is devoted to the religion of emancipation so
she decides to meet him. Using her Yoga powers, she assumes the form
of a faultlessly beautiful young woman and presents herself to Janaka as
a mendicant.
It is significant that she assumes both forms (of a woman and a mendicant), that is, neither form is integral to or inseparable from her self. This
connects to the philosophical point she makes later, that all forms are
transitory and apparent, not permanent or innate to the Atman. The king
is filled with wonder at her delicate form. He welcomes her as an honored
guest, seats her on an excellent seat, and offers her water to wash her feet
and good food to refresh herself. Bhishma continues:
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Doubting whether Janaka had succeeded in attaining to Emancipation, . . .
Sulabha, endued [endowed] with Yoga-power, entered the understanding of
the king by her own understanding. Restraining, by means of the rays of light
that emanated from her own eyes, the rays issuing from the eyes of the king,
the lady, desirous of ascertaining the truth, bound up King Janaka with Yoga
bonds. (Ganguly 1973, X:57)

The word “sanchodayishyanti,” used for her action, indicates that
she questions or examines him not in words but internally by her Yoga
powers. Janaka reacts with hostility to this examination. As a sage and a
king, Janaka has reached the pinnacle of two types of male achievement.
Sulabha’s internal questioning of him suggests that her Yoga powers equal
or surpass his own. Janaka is unused to being challenged or tested in this
way, but what particularly irks him is that a woman dares to test him as
an equal.

Janaka’s Conventional View of Women
Interrupting Sulabha’s questioning, Janaka addresses her at length. After
stating that he respects Sulabha and desires to know her thoroughly,
Janaka demands to know who she is, whose she is, where she has come
from, and where she is going. He declares that he is free from the vanity
of kingship, and he is the only person who can discourse to her on emancipation. He emphasizes his high spiritual lineage by pointing out that
he acquired his knowledge from his guru, Panchashikha of Parasara’s
race. Janaka claims that even though he is a king and is married, he has
attained knowledge of the Atman (knowledge of oneness of one’s Atman
with the universal Atman), and is free from all attachments. Though
alive, he is emancipated. He is free from love for his wife or hatred of his
enemies. In terms very close to those of Krishna’s instructions in the
BhagvadGita, he states that he views a lump of gold and a clod of earth
as equal, and a person who wounds him as equal to a person who honors
him.
He then makes the bold claim that he is superior to all ascetics who
have renounced the world. His argument in this regard is that an ascetic’s
renunciation of the world may be only apparent, not genuine, while conversely, a king’s attachment to and enjoyment of the world may be apparent, not genuine. He then aggressively tries to demonstrate that Sulabha
is not a genuine renunciant. His argument is not entirely logical for it
proceeds in the following manner: I am superior to all renunciants; renunciants may be attached to the world while kings may be unattached to
the world. You, Sulabha (because you are a woman), are actually attached
to the world, while I, the king, am not attached to the world. The only
prima facie true proposition here is the second—most people would agree
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and many texts demonstrate that some ascetics may be fake while some
householders may be emancipated. However, Janaka then proceeds to
demonstrate his third proposition by appealing to conventional notions
of gender roles, while his first proposition remains unproved. His bullying
tone and his masculinist attitude to Sulabha seem quite inappropriate for
a person who claims to be detached from the world and therefore from
social prejudices.
He begins his argument regarding Sulabha by telling her that her behavior does not correspond to the ascetic way of life. She is delicate, shapely,
and youthful, and he therefore doubts that she has subdued her senses.
The implication here is that a young and beautiful woman is incapable of
overcoming her desires for sensual and sexual pleasure.
He then goes on to say that her act of entering into him by Yoga powers
is sinful. He equates this act with sexual union, and in fact, a type of rape,
as he had not made any gesture inviting her to enter into him. Assuming that this is a physical union between a woman and a man, he points
out that it is wrong in at least four ways. First, since she is a Brahman
(he assumes that since she is an ascetic, she must belong to the Brahman
community) while he is a Kshatriya, a union between them would cause
an inappropriate mixture of two varnas (literally, colors; figuratively, the
four groups into which society is broadly divided). Second, since she is an
ascetic and he is a householder, a union between them would cause an
inappropriate mixture of two ways of life. Third, since neither of them
knows to which gotra (exogamous clans, marriage between members of
which is forbidden as incestuous) the other belongs, it is possible that the
union is an unnatural one between members of the same gotra. Fourth, if
she is married, the union is sinful (interestingly, his being married would
not make his union with her sinful, as a man may have many sexual relationships, but a woman only one). Finally, since he does not desire her,
her union with him is like poison.
He then goes on to speculate that she may have perpetrated all these
sinful acts because of “ignorance or perverted intelligence” (Ganguly
1973, X:61), but in any case, by trying to display her superiority to men,
she has shown herself to be a wicked woman. He wonders whether she is
the agent of some rival king. This speculation indicates that he is unable
to conceive of an autonomous female agent and so thinks she must be
merely an instrument, acting at the behest of a male. Janaka concludes
this diatribe by stating that the power of kings consists in sovereignty, the
power of Brahmans in the Vedas, and the power of women in their beauty,
youth, and marital blessedness, therefore one should never try to deceive a
king, a Brahman, or a good wife. He then reiterates his questions regarding
who she is, whose she is, and where she has come from.
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Sulabha’s Philosophical Response
Bhishma comments that Sulabha replies in words more beautiful than
her person. Sulabha begins her response with a discourse on speech. She
gives a learned account of the verbal faults and the faults of judgment that
can occur in speech, and says that her reply will be rational, clear, and not
prompted by emotions like desire, wrath, fear, or shame. She argues that
only a speaker who is able to communicate his meaning to the hearer is
worthy of the title of speaker.
Sulabha then proceeds to address the king’s questions—who she is,
whose she is, and where she comes from. Her answer is: “As lac and wood,
as grains of dust and drops of water, exist commingled when brought
together, even so are the existences of all creatures” (Ganguly 1973, X:
65). This is a statement of the philosophical position that the primal elements are the same in all bodies and beings, and the same consciousness
pervades all existents, therefore if Janaka were truly knowledgeable, he
would not ask her who she is, as he would know that she and he are essentially the same. To regard his own self as different from the self of other
beings is to lack wisdom.
Sulabha then proceeds to elaborate on the nature of the senses, the
consciousness, and the principles of existence. Her erudition is evident
both in this disquisition and in her earlier one on the nature of speech.
She describes how the fetus is formed from the process of insemination
and develops in the womb where it acquires a sex. She emphasizes the
fact that at every stage, “the constituent elements of the body . . . undergo
change every moment in every creature” (Ganguly 1973, X:66). Particles
of the body are constantly born and constantly die, but these changes are
so minute that they cannot be observed, just as one cannot perceive the
changes in the flame of a lamp. Given this state of constant change and
flux in individual identity, “who then has come whence or not whence,
or whose is it or whose is it not” (X:67)? Identity, being in flux, cannot be
fi xed or possessed.6
This argument demonstrates that sex difference is not an essential difference. To consider it essential is to be deluded. The king’s emphasis on
sex difference shows that he is not liberated, as he claims to be. If he were,
he would see no difference between himself and others: “If it is true thou
hast, O king, been freed from the knowledge of duality that says—this
is mine and this other is not mine—then what use is there with such
questions as, Who art thou, whose art thou and whence does thou come”
(Ganguly 1973, X:67).
She points out that a king who acts toward others as enemies or allies
is not emancipated. Here she gestures toward his hostility to her. A king
who does not look with an equal eye on the weak and the strong is not
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emancipated. Janaka views her, a woman, as not equal to men. This shows
his lack of emancipation.
Sulabha proceeds to point out how little power or control a king actually has. Despite all his wealth and property, he can use only a limited
number of things and consume a limited number of objects. He is always
dependent on others, such as his counselors, and his life is circumscribed
by the demands of others. He can sleep and eat only when permitted and
often cannot gratify his desires because he has to transact the business of
the state. She also shows that a king cannot be truly detached from the
world. He is mistrustful of others, and a prey to fear, grief, alarm, insomnia, and unsubstantial happiness. The king shares the attachments and
problems of all householders. Other men are kings in their own homes
and suffer similar losses and victories on a smaller scale.
Finally, Sulabha demonstrates that her intellectual union with the king
is not sinful. She has not touched him physically and it is a misinterpretation to consider this a sexual union. It was improper for him to proclaim
before his court that she had entered into union with him. The intellectual communion between them was a private matter and by making it
public and describing it in sexual terms, he has disrespected himself, her,
and his courtiers.
Sulabha declares that her body is different from Janaka’s but there is
no difference between her Self or Spirit (Atman) and his Self or any other
person’s Self. Janaka confused body and Self/Spirit when he considered
the union of selves to be a bodily union. A wise person knows that the
Self has no real connection with his/her own body, let alone the bodies of
others. Her assessment is that while Janaka is not fully immersed in the
domestic mode of life, he has not yet attained emancipation. He is midway
between the two, pretending to be emancipated.
She tells Janaka that she belongs to a royal family and no husband could
be found fit for her. She wanders over the earth alone, practicing asceticism. She tells him that she is in fact a Kshatriya, just like him. Once
again, Janaka has betrayed his prejudiced assumptions by assuming that
all ascetics are Brahmans or that only a Brahman can be an ascetic. She
says that she came to meet him only to discuss emancipation with him.
She points out that nothing she has said is meant to glorify herself or to
humiliate opponents, since an emancipated person, being tranquil, speaks
only to express the truth and never to engage in intellectual competition
or to win a dispute. Bhishma comments that Janaka is unable to answer
Sulabha’s reasoned words. This indicates that her arguments are unanswerable. At the end of this debate, Janaka is silenced by truth, unlike
Gargi, who in her debate with Yajnavalkya, is silenced by terror tactics.

T HE S ELF I S N OT G ENDERED

87

Janaka Versus Sulabha: Arrogance Versus Dignity
Most modern discussions of the Mahabharata do not mention Sulabha.
One scholar, who mentions her in passing, dismisses her as “just a maverick and nothing more” (Shah 1995, 68). While there is no doubt that
Sulabha, as a learned single woman, is an exception in the Mahabharata,
nevertheless the recurrent presence of this figure in several texts and her
triumph in this text do show that celibacy and learning were conceived
of as options for the few women who might manage to define themselves
as exceptional.
Much more important, however, is the content of the debate, wherein
Sulabha provides philosophical justification for equality and non-differentiation between women and men. Similar statements regarding
non-differentiation made elsewhere in the Mahabharata, for example, in
the BhagvadGita (the man of steady wisdom sees no difference between
a Brahman and an elephant, a cow and a cow-eater), are not transposed
from perception (what the wise man sees) to social action (how the wise
man treats these beings, although many stories in the epics do suggest
that the wise man would treat all beings with respect). Sulabha, however,
tells Janaka not just that he was wrong to see her and himself as different because of gender, but also that he acted wrongly when he followed
social conventions regarding gender and reproached her for ignoring those
conventions.
Janaka and his arguments regarding gender are easily recognizable and
conventional ones. First, he defines a woman by her ties to men, and if
he cannot do so, he becomes very uncomfortable. Hence his anxiety to
know “whose” Sulabha is. As in the oft-quoted dictum of Manu, Janaka
believes that a woman always belongs to some man—father, husband,
or son. If she does not belong to one man, she is then a wicked or loose
woman who cannot be trusted as she may unite with any man, activated
by lust, or may act as a spy for a king and deceive other kings.
Second, Janaka doubts that a beautiful young woman is capable of subduing her senses—this misogynist doubt is in consonance with the many
pronouncements regarding the uncontrollable nature of women’s sexual
desires found in ancient and medieval texts, both Indian and European.
Since he defines women as sexual, not intellectual or spiritual, beings (he
claims that a woman’s power consists only in youth, beauty, and marital
blessedness), it follows that he cannot conceive of any communion or
union between a woman and a man that is not sexual. Hence his allegation that by entering into inner union with him through Yoga, Sulabha
has in fact entered into physical union with him. Here, his thinking is
in consonance with that of the many stories in the epics and Puranas of
temptresses seducing men who have renounced desire.
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Janaka arrogantly imagines that since he has achieved emancipation,
but Sulabha as an unmarried young woman is incapable of doing so, her
only aim could be to destroy him by seducing him. Janaka cannot conceive of even a seductress acting entirely on her own initiative. Indeed,
the temptresses in the epic and Puranic stories rarely act on their own
initiative; they are usually sent by the ascetic’s rivals (often the gods) to
divest a man of his Yoga powers. Hence Janaka suspects that a rival king
has sent Sulabha to ruin him.
Third, Janaka displays throughout an arrogance that is unbecoming to
an emancipated or wise person and also to a good king. He shows none of
the humility of good kings like Rama and Yudhishthira, and makes the
outrageous claim that he is superior to all ascetics, a type of claim usually
made by demons such as Bakasura just before their fall. The hostility he
displays towards Sulabha represents the specifically male dimension of
his arrogance. Even though she is his guest, he insults her, accusing her
of wickedness and evildoing.
Sulabha’s response is remarkable for its dignity. Her analysis of the
faults of speech demonstrates (without stating it) that Janaka’s speech is
faulty because it is impelled by anger, not reason. She also indirectly critiques his hostility to her when she points out that an emancipated king
would view the weak and the strong with an equal eye.
Her reasoned response to Janaka’s argument is very important, because
here the text provides an answer to the popular view that gender altogether defines a woman’s role and her dharma. Sulabha’s argument is
grounded in basic Hindu philosophical premises, with which few orthodox Hindus would disagree, and this is its strength. Her primary arguments may be summarized thus:
1. The body is gendered but the Atman (universal Self/Spirit) is not gendered.
2. The body acquires its gender at a certain stage in the womb, and the body
changes constantly, so even the body is not always gendered in the same
way, that is, even bodily gender is not a fi xed or static thing.
3. The Atman is one and the same in all beings, regardless of the body’s
gender.
4. The Atman is neither the property of anyone nor under the control of
anyone, and the Atman does not really act.

Following from these philosophical premises are her important secondary
arguments that have practical implications for women’s social status:
1. Since the same Atman animates both women and men, women are capable
of pursuing the same paths as men.
2. A truly wise person, who has realized the oneness of the Atman, will not
try to judge anyone, including any woman, by caste or marital status.
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3. The Atman is not the property of anyone, so a truly wise person realizes
that to ask a woman to whom she belongs is meaningless.
4. Since the Atman is one, intellectual or spiritual communion/union
between any two persons, including a man and a woman, is not the same
as physical union, and is not wrong.

Wifely Devotion as Agency
The debate between the married woman and Kaushika in the Mahabharata is at the other end of the spectrum but establishes a similar thesis.
In this story, the ascetic Kaushika goes on his rounds asking for alms,
and gets annoyed when a devoted housewife keeps him waiting while
she serves her husband. When he reproaches her despite her apology, she
replies with dignity, and gives him an extended scholarly lecture wherein
she demonstrates that a true Brahman is not one who merely knows the
scriptures but rather one who has overcome anger and “who looketh upon
all equal unto himself” (Ganguly 1973, II:424). This point is the same as
Sulabha’s—a truly wise person sees no difference between a man and a
woman.
She also claims that the path of virtue she follows is that of devotion
to her husband whom she regards as the highest god. While this may be
read as a glorification of subservience, it is worth noting the element of
agency that the woman claims when she says “I practise that virtue which
consists in serving my husband” (Ganguly 1973, II:424). Unlike Sulabha,
she follows the conventional path of most women, yet this path has led
her to acquire greater virtue than the sage.
The housewife dares to tell the great Brahman sage, “I think, O holy
one, that thou dost not know what virtue in reality is” (II:425). She then
sends him to a fowler for further instruction. The Brahman realizes that
her analysis of his failings is accurate and that her reproof will be advantageous to him. The fowler, who belongs to a very low caste and is engaged
in a profession (killing living creatures) regarded as despicable, turns out
to be a highly meritorious person “with senses under complete control,”
who is completely devoted to his parents (II:425). He considers his parents
to be his highest deities and serves them night and day. The next several
chapters are occupied with the fowler’s learned discourse, as he teaches
the Brahman the nature of true virtue and detachment.
The idea that emerges is that an apparently lowly and unimportant way
of life may also be a site for self-realization. Like Janaka, Kaushika has
acquired knowledge of the Vedas and other scriptures but has not acquired
the virtue that comes from right practice. This right practice may be that
of asceticism as in Sulabha’s case, or that of a layperson’s selfless life, as
in the case of the housewife and the fowler.
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The housewife’s statement of her own practice is suggestive of agency,
choice, self-conscious practice, and the dignity arising therefrom. This
practice puts her in a position to critique and reprove a powerful man who
is a major philosophical figure. As compared to Sulabha, the housewife
is not independent, and, from our point of view today, appears to be in an
unfortunate position. Yet, the text attempts to cultivate an understanding
of all social positions—whether that of king, sage or fowler, housewife
or ascetic, male or female—as ephemeral, and the pursuit of self-realization—whether by the path of devotion, action, or asceticism—as permanently valuable.

Hindu Philosophy and Women’s Choices
Sulabha’s victory in the debate (demonstrated by Janaka’s inability to
answer her) justifies her own choices in life (not to marry, to wander the
world alone, to seek emancipation by the same path as men), and her
actions (to enter into public debate with a famous man, to enter into Yogic
union with him). Although she is an exception in the Mahabharata, it
is important to note that she is a recurrent figure in several texts widely
separated by time, and is thus an emblematic figure, like Janaka. Her
choices act as a model and her arguments provide a philosophical justification, within Hinduism, for any woman to make unconventional choices.
Her arguments are not restricted to women of any particular caste or class;
since they are based on the oneness of the universal Atman, they apply to
any woman anywhere.
Medieval women mystics, like the famous poet and fi fteenth-century
princess, Mirabai, also a Kshatriya renunciant, thus emerge in the context
of medieval devotion and also in the context of an older tradition that
makes space for women. Before the modern period, social conditions prevented women in most societies throughout the world (not just in India)
from staying single and pursuing intellectual and spiritual paths in an
autonomous manner; it is important that when exceptional women have
made such choices in India, they have usually found some acceptance, not
just on the fringes, but even in the mainstream of society. Hindu philosophy easily lends itself to arguments such as those of Sulabha.
While many Hindu texts, especially law books, and Hindu philosophy
itself are often used to justify inequality and non-freedom, Hindu texts
and Hindu philosophical arguments have also frequently been used, both
in pre-modern and in modern India, to legitimize egalitarianism and freedom. For example, in the nineteenth century, Ramabai (1858–1922), a
young widow educated by her father, demonstrated her knowledge of Sanskrit and began to work to educate women. A conclave of Brahmans gave
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her the title “Pandita” (feminine version of Pandit, meaning a scholar).
She retained this title throughout her life, even after her conversion to
Christianity, and is still known today as Pandita Ramabai Saraswati.
The representation of a female figure winning a debate, which is a
battle of words, arguably works as a more imitable model than the representation of a female winning a battle with weapons. Both in texts
and in life, many more females engage in debate and conversation than
in warfare. Kali’s or Durga’s miraculous victories in battle may inspire
women to fight for justice or to take revenge on oppressors; Sulabha’s
logical victory in debate has the potential to make the oppressor see the
folly of his thinking.

Focusing on Debate
When we focus on the dynamic debates regarding gender that flourish
in ancient Hindu texts we help combat the stereotype of these texts as
either monolithically justifying the subordination of women or as monolithically honoring women. This endeavor enables us to study how these
pre-modern textual debates have reflected and enabled ongoing non-textual debates as well as many different societal trends and practices in
Indian societies through the ages. Finally, it also helps us understand that
modern Indian debates about gender have a history that is not traceable
to Euro-American feminism alone, a history that defines the questions
and poses the answers both similarly to and differently from the way the
questions and answers have been posited in Euro-American debates about
gender.
I would like to thank the anonymous NWSA Journal readers whose
reports helped me to refi ne my argument and improve this essay.
Ruth Vanita is Professor of Liberal Studies and Women’s Studies at the
University of Montana. She taught at Delhi University for many years,
and was founding co-editor of Manushi: A Journal About Women and
Society. She is the author of Sappho and the Virgin Mary: Same-Sex
Love and the English Literary Imagination, co-author of Same-Sex Love
in India: Readings in Literature and History, co-editor of In Search of
Answers: Indian Women’s Voices from Manushi, and editor of Queering
India. She has received an ACLS fellowship to work towards a book on
long-term same-sex unions and marriages in pre-modern and modern
Indian socio-political, religious, legal, and literary contexts. Correspondence should be sent to Vanita at Liberal Studies Program, University of
Montana, Missoula, MT 59812; rvanita@selway.umt.edu.

92

R UTH VANITA

Notes
1. Even Vidyalankar (1984) fails to discuss Sulabha in her study specifically
of the Shanti Parva, the section of the Mahabharata in which the debate
occurs.
2. Kishwar (2000) makes a similar point, but takes it much further than I
am willing to take it. She argues, for example, that Manu, the putative author
of the Manusmriti (who may well be an amalgam of many authors), would
have supported Kishwar’s right to compose her own Smriti (sacred remembered text) if “he” lived today.
3. This is broadly the approach taken by Altekar in his pioneering work, The
Position of Women in Hindu Civilization (1956) and also by Bader (1925).
Bhavalkar (1999) belongs to the same school.
4. For example, the Shanti Parva, in which the Sulabha-Janaka debate occurs,
also contains about one third of the precepts of the Manusmriti, repeated in
near-identical form.
5. Pintchman (1994) argues that Indian women have been unable to draw
on these goddesses as models. She suggests, though, that Kali could be an
empowering model (213). McDermott (1996) shows how Kali is the most congenial of all Hindu goddesses both to scholars and to feminists in the West.
In Hawley and Wulff’s anthology, Devi: The Goddesses of India (1996), there
are essays on consort goddesses like Radha and warrior goddesses like Kali,
but no essay on Saraswati. Kinsley (1986) is an exception, as he studies each
individual goddess, including Saraswati, in some detail. Interestingly, major
mainstream Indian publishing houses have chosen the names of the goddess
of learning, Saraswati and Sharada, as names for their enterprises, while the
Indian feminist publishing house is called Kali.
6. A point made in different ways by many Western philosophers as well,
from Heraclitus to Montaigne and David Hume, and most recently by postmodernists.
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